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FEDERAL COURTS-USE

OF MANDAMUS

TO COMPEL ADJUDICATION

OF

A CLAIM WITHIN EXCLUSIVE FEDERAL JURISDICTION.

Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co. (U.S. 1978)
In July 1974, American Mutual Reinsurance Company (Amreco) brought
suit for declaratory judgment against Calvert Fire Insurance Company
(Calvert) in an Illinois state court,' seeking to establish that a contract of reinsurance between itself and Calvert was in full force and effect. 2 Calvert's
answer, filed in January 1975, alleged that the agreement was unenforceable
because Amreco had violated the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act), 3 the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), 4 the Illinois Securities Act,' and
the Maryland Securities Law, 6 and because Amreco was guilty of common
law fraud. 7 Calvert also counterclaimed for two million dollars in damages,
asserting all the grounds it had asserted in its defense except the alleged
violation of rule 10b-5. 8 Calvert excluded the rule 10b-5 claim for damages
from the state court counterclaim because actions under the 1934 Act are
subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction. 9
On the same day, Calvert filed suit in federal court, 10 seeking rescission
of its agreement with Amreco and claiming two million dollars in damages."
Calvert's suit was grounded upon the same violations of the se1. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 658 (1978). Suit was brought in the Circuit
Court of Cook County, Illinois. Id. The circuit court opinion is unreported.
2. Id. A reinsurance policy is a device by which primary insurers seek to lessen the risk of
financial losses from claims exceeding their premium intake. See id. In early 1974, Calvert
joined Amreco's "multiple line pool." Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Will, 560 F.2d 792, 793 (7th Cir.
1977), rev'd, 437 U.S. 655 (1978). By the terms of the reinsurance agreement, Calvert was to
pay premiums to Amreco, earning a pro rata share of Amreco's balance remaining after the
deduction of losses paid to primary insurers and Amreco's management fee. 560 F.2d at 793.
On the other hand, if Amreco's losses exceeded the pool premiums, it was to be indemnified by
the pool members. Id.
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
4. Calvert contended in its answer that the agreement was unenforceable because under
rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978), enacted pursuant to § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), the agreement could be rescinded. 437 U.S. at 659 n.1.
5. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121

, § 137.1-.19 (1978).

6. 1937 Md. Laws ch. 348, as amended by 1961 Md. Laws ch. 1 (repealed 1975 Md. Laws
ch. 311, § 1) current version at MD. CoRP. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 11-101 to 11-908 (1978).
7. 437 U.S. at 658. Calvert gave notice of rescission to Amreco in April 1974, after receiving Amreco's financial statement and 1973 annual report. 560 F.2d at 793. Finding itself pro
rata accountable for the pool's substantial losses, Calvert concluded that it had been fraudulently
induced to join the pool in that Amreco had withheld material financial data sought by Calvert
during their negotiations. Id.
8. 437 U.S. at 658.
9. Id. The 1934 Act specifically provides for federal jurisdiction:
The district courts of the United States . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations
of ... [the 1934 Act] or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity
and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by . . . [the 1934 Act]
or the rules and regulations thereunder. ...
15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976).
10. Calvert filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
437 U.S. at 658.
11. id.

(815)
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curities laws alleged in its state court counterclaim and the alleged violation
of rule 10b-5.12
In February 1975, Amreco moved to abate, or, in the alternative, to
dismiss the federal court action. 13 Judge Will, United States District Judge
for the Northern District of Illinois, ruled on the motions on May 6, 1975,
staying all of Calvert's claims, except its claim for damages under rule 10b-5,
pending the completion of the state proceedings.' 4 On May 9, 1975, Judge
Will heard oral argument on the rule 10b-5 claim, but has yet to render a
decision on that issue. 15 In an unreported decision in June 1975, the state
trial court ruled that the reinsurance agreement was not a "security" within
the meaning of the federal securities laws, thereby barring Calvert's rule
16
10b-5 defense.
Judge Will had twice refused requests by Calvert to reconsider his
order staying its claims, and had declined to certify an interlocutory appeal. 1 7 Calvert therefore sought a writ of mandamus,' 8 which was granted
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and which
directed Judge Will to adjudicate the claims for equitable and monetary relief under the 1934 Act. 19 On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
reversed, 20 holding that a writ of mandamus may not issue to direct federal
adjudication of a claim for damages within the exclusive jurisdiction of the

12. Id. at 658-59.
13. Id. at 659. The motion to dismiss was based on the contention that the reinsurance
agreement was not a "security" within the meaning of either the 1933 Act or the 1934 Act. Id.
The motion to abate was based on the fact that the state court proceeding had been initiated
some six months prior to the federal proceeding and included all the contested claims except
that alleged under rule 10b-5. Id.
14. Id. In a memorandum opinion, Judge Will noted that a tentative trial date had already
been set in the state court and that federal litigation of the same issues would be duplicative
and wasteful. Id.
15. Id. at 660.
16. Id. n.2. The Illinois Appellate Court subsequently affirmed the decision of the trial
court, and the Supreme Court of Illinois denied leave to appeal. American Mut. Reinsurance
Co. v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 52 Ill. App. 3d 922, 367 N.E.2d 104 (1977), petition for leave to
appeal denied, No. 50,085 (I11.Jan. 26, 1978), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978).
17. 437 U.S. at 660. As Judge Will's stay order was not a final order, it was not directly
appealable. 560 F.2d at 794, citing Cotler v. Inter-County Orthopaedic Ass'n, 526 F.2d 537,
540 (3d Cir. 1975). Calvert therefore sought judicial review of the order by petitioning for a writ
of mandamus. 437 U.S. at 660.
Recently, Judge Will reconfirmed and expanded his stay. See note 97 and accompanying
text infra.
18. 560 F.2d at 794. The Seventh Circuit stated that "Calvert . . . therefore partially
[sought] reversal of the district court's decision to stay Calvert's claim for equitable relief and
partially [sought] an order compelling Judge Will to immediately decide the claim for damages
over which he . . . retained jurisdiction." Id.
19. Id. at 797. The Seventh Circuit noted that although Judge Will had acted properly
under that court's prior ruling in Aetna State Bank v. Altheimer, 430 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1970),
the Aetna decision was no longer dispositive in light of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800
(1976). 560 F.2d at 796. For a discussion of Colorado River, see notes 35-46 and accompanying
text infra.
20. 437 U.S. at 667. Calvert was a 5-4 decision. Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment on separate grounds. See notes 64 & 65 and accompanying text infra.
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federal courts where the issue is concurrently being heard by way of defense
in a state court proceeding. Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co., 437 U.S. 655
(1978).
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Railroad Commission v.
Pullman Co. 2 1 marked the advent of abstention as an accepted federal court
procedure, 22 and federal district courts have utilized various forms of the
doctrine to resolve some of the difficulties inherent in a system of concurrent
state and federal jurisdiction.2 3 In essence, abstention is a doctrine under
which a federal court may decline to exercise or may postpone the exercise
24
of its jurisdiction in favor of another court with concurrent jurisdiction.
The lower federal courts, in response to drastically increased dockets,
have employed the abstention doctrine to conserve judicial resources by
avoiding duplicative litigation. 25 The federal courts of appeals, in the abthe
sence of a specific Supreme Court decision to the contrary, have upheld
26
power of the district courts to stay actions under such circumstances.
A major Supreme Court statement on abstention was made in Brillhart
v. Excess Insurance Co. of America.2 7 Brillhart, the administrator of a decedent's estate, had obtained a default judgment against Central Mutual Insurance Company (Central), the insurer of the carrier responsible for the deceBrillhart subsequently instituted garnishment proceedings
dent's death . 2z
against Central in state court.2 9 The Excess Insurance Company of America
(Excess), upon learning of its possible liability to Brillhart as a reinsurer of
Central, instituted an action in federal court seeking to determine its rights
under the reinsurance agreement with Central. 30 Brillhart made Excess a
party to the garnishment proceeding, 3 1 however, and sought dismissal of the
federal suit on the ground that the issues involved could be fully decided in
the state proceeding.3 2 The United States Supreme Court agreed that a
dismissal was within the discretion of the district court,3 3 stating that

21. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
22. See Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 590, 590 (1977).
23. For a discussion of the various forms of abstention, see note 40 and accompanying text
infra.
24. See County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188 (1959). Concurrent
jurisdiction may arise between two federal courts or between a state and a federal court.
25. See Ashman, Alflni & Shapiro, Federal Abstention: New Perspectives on its Current
Vitality, 46 Miss. L.J. 629, 631-32 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Federal Abstention].
26. See IA MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.203[4], at 2136 & n.6 (2d ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as MOoRE].
27. 316 U.S. 491 (1942).
28. Id. at 492.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 492-93. See Excess Ins. Co. of America v. Brillhart, 121 F.2d 776, 777-78 (10th
Cir. 1941), rev'd, 316 U.S. 491 (1942).
31. 316 U.S. at 493.
32. Id. The district court dismissed the action, but the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit reversed, directing the district court to hear the case. Excess Ins. Co. of
America v. Brillhart, 121 F.2d 776, 778 (10th Cir. 1941), rev'd, 316 U.S. 491 (1942).
33. 316 U.S. at 498.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1979

3

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 4 [1979], Art. 8

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

24: p. 815

[o]rdinarily it would be uneconomical as well as vexatious for a
federal court to proceed in a declaratory judgment suit where
another suit is pending in a state court presenting the same issues,
not governed by federal law, between the same parties. Gratuitous
interference with the orderly and comprehensive disposition of a
34
state court litigation should be avoided.
Recently, in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United
States,3 5 the Supreme Court enunciated what seems to be a restatement of
the abstention doctrine. In Colorado River, the United States instituted an
action in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, seeking to assert certain reserved water rights.3 6 Shortly thereafter, one of the
defendants filed suit in state court to adjudicate all of the Government's
claims. 37 The district court granted a motion by the defendants to dismiss
the federal action, reasoning that the abstention doctrine required deference
to the state court proceedings. 38 On appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that abstention was inappropriate.39
In reversing the decision of the Tenth Circuit, the Supreme Court
noted three categories to which abstention traditionally has been confined. 4 0 The Court recognized that the situation presented in Colorado

34. Id. at 495.
35. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
36. Id. at 805. The state of Colorado is divided into seven water conservation districts for
the purpose of allocating water and adjudicating conflicting claims to that resource. The regulatory scheme is codified in Colorado's Water Right Determination and Administration Act,
COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to -602 (1973). The United States claimed reserved water rights
under state and federal law. 424 U.S. at 805-06. Federal court jurisdiction was invoked under a
statute which provides: "Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the
United States, or by any agency or officer thereof expressly authorized to sue by Act of Congress."
28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1976).
37. 424 U.S. at 806. Jurisdiction over the United States'by the state court was obtained
under the McCarran Water Rights Suit Act, 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1976). 424 U.S. at 806.
38. 424 U.S. at 806. The district court opinion was unreported. Id.
39. United States v. Akin, 504 F.2d 115, 122 (10th Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Colorado
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
40. 424 U.S. at 814-17. The categories noted by the Court included "cases presenting a
federal constitutional issue which might be mooted or presented in a different posture by a state
court determination of pertinent state law." id. at 814, quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank
Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 189 (1959). This category, known as "Pullman abstention," was first
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
The Colorado River Court was careful to note, however, that "the opportunity to avoid decision
of a constitutional question does not alone justify abstention by a federal court." 424 U.S. at 815
n.21, citing Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
Moreover, the Court stated that "the presence of a federal basis for jurisdiction may raise the
level of justification needed for abstention." 424 U.S. at 815 n.21, citing Burford v. Sun Oil
Co., 319 U.S. 315, 318 n.5 (1943); Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U.S. 52, 61 (1933). For a discussion of
the Pullman doctrine, see MOORE, supra note 26, 0.203[11], at 2101-18; Field, supra note 22.
The second class of cases recognized by the Colorado River Court were those presenting
"difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import ...
transcend[ing] the result in the case then at bar." 424 U.S. at 814, citing Kaiser Steel Corp. v.
W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360
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River did not fall within any of the enumerated categories, 4 ' but nevertheless held that dismissal in favor of the pending state litigation was proper
under considerations of "wise judicial administration." 4 2 After noting the
"virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them," 43 and that the "circumstances permitting the dismissal of
a federal suit due to the presence of a concurrent state proceeding for
reasons of wise judicial administration are considerably more limited than
the circumstances appropriate for abstention,"'' the Court determined that

U.S. 25 (1959); Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U.S. 52 (1933). The Court noted that in order for a case
to fall within this category, "[i]t is enough that exercise of federal review ... would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public
concern." 424 U.S. at 814, citing Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341
(1951); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). See generally MOORE, supra note 26,
0.203[2], at 2118-30.1.
The third category noted by the Court included cases where "absent bad faith, harassment,
or a patently invalid state statute, federal jurisdiction has been invoked for the purpose of
restraining state criminal proceedings . . ., state nuisance proceedings antecedent to a criminal
prosecution, . . .or collection of state taxes." 424 U.S. at 816 (footnote omitted), citing Huffman
v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Douglas v. City of
Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293
(1943). See generally MOORE, supra note 26, $ 0.203[3], at 2131-35.
41. 424 U.S. at 817. The Court also noted that
[a]bstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule. "The
doctrine of abstention, under which a District Court may decline to exercise or postpone
the exercise of its jurisdiction, is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a
District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it. Abdication of the obligation
to decide cases can be justified under this doctrine only in the exceptional circumstances
where the order to the parties to repair to the State court would clearly serve an important countervailing interest."
Id. at 813, quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959).
42. 424 U.S. at 817-21. The Court noted that these principles of "wise judicial administration" were "unrelated to considerations of proper constitutional adjudication and regard for
federal-state relations," and that they "govern in situations involving the contemporaneous exercise of concurrent jurisdictions, either by federal courts or by state and federal courts." Id. at
817. Continuing, the Court stated that "considerations of '[w]ise judicial administration giv[e]
regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation.' " Id.,
quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952). See generally
0.203[4], at 2135-42; Federal Abstention, supra note 25, at 631-48.
MOORE, supra note 26,
43. 424 U.S. at 817. The Court stated that "[g]enerally, as between state and federal courts,
the rule is that 'the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning
the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction.' " Id., quoting McClellan v. Carland,
217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910). However, it noted that "[a]s between federal district courts, . . .the
general principle is to avoid duplicative litigation." 424 U.S. at 817, citing Kerotest Mfg. Co. v.
C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180 (1952); Steelman v. All Continent Corp., 301 U.S. 278
(1937); Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936). The reason for this difference, the Court
noted, "stems from the virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them." 424 U.S. at 817, citing England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415
(1964); McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 281 (1910); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
264, 404 (1821) (dictum).
44. 424 U.S. at 818. The Court added that "[tihe former circumstances, though exceptional,
do nevertheless exist." Id. The Court noted some of the factors to be considered in determining
whether dismissal for reasons of "wise judicial administration" would be appropriate. One such
circumstance involved the exercise of in rem or quasi in rein jurisdiction, where exclusive jurisdiction would be recognized in the first court that assumed control over the contested property.
Id., citing Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 412 (1964); Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305
U.S. 456, 466 (1939); United States v. Bank of New York Co., 296 U.S. 463, 477 (1936).
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dismissal was proper since "a number of factors clearly counsel against concurrent federal proceedings." 45 Although the Court recognized "wise judicial administration" as a ground for dismissal, 46 the scope of this ground has
yet to be defined.
Writing for the Court in Calvert, Justice Rehnquist 4 7 first recognized
that a writ of mandamus is the appropriate remedy to compel a lower federal
court to exercise its authority when it is under a duty to do so. 4 8 He noted,
however, that such a duty would only arise when the right to an adjudication
4 9
of a claim in the district court is "clear and indisputable."
In deciding whether Calvert's right to a district court adjudication of its
claim was "clear and indisputable," Justice Rehnquist, relying primarily on
Brillhart,50 reasoned that although
"the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court having juris-

Another consideration concerned the "inconvenience of the federal forum." 424 U.S. at 818,
citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947). Moreover, the Court noted that the
"desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation" was a factor to consider in dismissing the federal
suit. 424 U.S. at 818, citing Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942).
Finally, it was urged that the order in which the concurrent forums obtained jurisdiction might
influence the district court's decision to dismiss the action. 424 U.S. at 818, citing Pacific Live
Stock Co. v. Oregon Water Bd., 241 U.S. 440, 447 (1916). The Court advised that -[n]o one
factor is necessarily determinative; a carefully considered judgment taking into account both the
obligation to exercise jurisdiction and the combination of factors counselling against that exercise
is required." 424 U.S. at 818-19, citing Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936).
In conclusion, the Court indicated that "[o]nly the clearest of justifications will warrant dismissal." 424 U.S. at 819.
45. 424 U.S. at 819. The Court accorded great weight to the federal policy embodied in the
McCarran amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1976), characterizing it as "a policy that recognizes the
availability of comprehensive state systems for adjudication of water rights as the means for
achieving these [federal] goals." 424 U.S. at 819. See note 37 supra. The Court also found
significant the absence of proceedings in the district court other than the filing of the complaint,
the extensive involvement of state water rights, the distance between the water conservation
district and the federal courthouse, and the contemporaneous participation of the United States
in other state water rights proceedings. 424 U.S. at 820.
In light of the Court's reliance on the McCarran amendment in its determination of the
appropriateness of the dismissal, one commentator has stated that Colorado River provides little,
if any, authorization for district court stays or dismissals on the ground of pendent state pro0.203[4], at 2140. Indeed, after Colorado River, the
ceedings. See MOORE, supra note 26,
Seventh Circuit expressly overruled its prior decisions allowing district courts to exercise their
discretionary power to stay federal proceedings. See note 19 supra.
46. See note 42 and accompanying text supra. Colorado River was a 6-3 decision. The dissenters endorsed the majority's pronouncement of the use of the abstention doctrine, but disagreed
with the recognition of a previously unauthorized ground for dismissal. 424 U.S. at 821
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
47. Justice Rehnquist was joined in his opinion by Justices Stewart, White, and Stevens.
48. 437 U.S. at 661, citing Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943). Justice
Rehnquist stated: "There can be no doubt that, where a district court persistently and without
reason refuses to adjudicate a case properly before it, the Court of Appeals may issue the writ
'in order that [it] may exercise the jurisdiction of review given by law.' " 437 U.S. at 661-62,
quoting Insurance Co. v. Comstock, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 258, 270 (1873).
49. 437 U.S. at 662, quoting Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384 (1953),
quoting United States v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576, 582 (1899).
50. 437 U.S. at 662. For a discussion of Brillhart, see notes 27-34 and accompanying text
supra. Justice Rehnquist's reliance on Brillhart was criticized both by Justice Brennan in a dis-
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diction," [i]t is equally well settled that a district court is "under
no compulsion to exercise that jurisdiction" where the controversy
may be settled more expeditiously in the state court. 51
Justice Rehnquist concluded that the decision to exercise jurisdiction rests
largely on the "carefully considered judgment" of the district court. 52 Although he recognized the "virtually unflagging obligation" 53 of the federal
courts to exercise their jurisdiction, Justice Rehnquist maintained that this
obligation in no way undermined the power of the district courts to exercise
54
the discretion recognized in Brillhart.
Applying the two premises he had adopted, Justice Rehnquist reasoned
that one cannot logically have a "clear and indisputable" right, which is
necessary for the issuance of a writ of mandamus, 55 to the adjudication of a
matter that has been committed to the district court's discretion. 56 He
therefore concluded that even an abuse of discretion by the district court
should not be overridden by a writ of mandamus. 57 Consequently, with
senting opinion and by Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion. See notes 65 & 67 and
accompanying text infra.
51. 437 U.S. at 662-63, quoting Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, 494
(1942); McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910). The Court in McClellan held that a
federal court may not withhold resolution of a claim over which it has cognizance and allow the
question to be brought and decided in a state court. 217 U.S. at 281. Justice Rehnquist noted
that the remedy allowed in McClellan was not a writ of mandamus, but rather an order to show
cause why such a writ should not issue. 437 U.S. at 663 n.6. This comment is somewhat misleading as the Court in McClellan authorized the issuance of either a writ or an order to show
cause. See 217 U.S. at 283.
52. 437 U.S. at 663, quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424
U.S. 800, 818 (1976). See note 44 and accompanying text supra. Justice Rehnquist recognized
that this discretionary power of district court judges has recently been acknowledged. 437 U.S.
at 663. He distinguished McClellan by noting that the exercise of jurisdiction mandated by that
decision was appropriate in a day when there was little overlap between federal and state court
jurisdiction. Id. For a discussion of McClellan, see note 51 supra. In contrast, under the modern system of expanded federal jurisdiction and concomitant jurisdictional conflicts, Justice
Rehnquist reasoned that the McClellan rationale was no longer applicable, and that situations
often arise where deferral to a state court would be appropriate. 437 U.S. at 663. Justice
Rehnquist again relied on Brillhart as illustrative of this view, reiterating that "[t]he decision in
such circumstances is largely committed to the discretion of the District Court." 437 U.S. at
664, citing Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, 494 (1942).
53. 437 U.S. at 664, quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424
U.S. 800, 817 (1976). See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
54. 437 U.S. at 664. Justice Rehnquist noted that the "unflagging obligation" should be a
factor considered by the court in the exercise of its discretion. Id. He reasoned that it was good
policy to commit a stay decision to the discretion of the district court, stating that "a busy
federal trial judge .. .is . . . entrusted with a wide latitude in setting his own calendar." Id. at
665. See also Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936).
55. See notes 48 & 49 and accompanying text supra.
56. 437 U.S. at 665-66.
57. Id. at 665. Justice Rehnquist concluded that the proper method of reviewing a district
court's exercise of its discretion in staying a proceeding was by interlocutory appeal. Id., citing
Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 256-59 (1936). Justice Rehnquist distinguished La Buy
v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957), where the Supreme Court allowed a writ of mandamus to issue to correct a district judge's abuse of discretion in improperly allowing a case to
be heard by a master. According to Justice Rehnquist, soon after La Buy, the Court warned
against the dangers of the issuance of writs of mandamus upon a mere showing of abuse of
discretion. 437 U.S. at 665 n.7, citing Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 98 n.6 (1967). But see
note 76 infra.
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respect to Calvert's claim for equitable relief under rule 10b-5, 58 the plurality held that in view of the concurrent state jurisdiction and the discretionary nature of stay orders in such situations, a writ of mandamus could not
issue. 59 Justice Rehnquist dispensed with the contention that the equitable
claim remained an "exclusive" federal claim by reasoning that the fact that
the issue may be resolved by the state court 6 0 made the situation indistinguishable from those in which there exists concurrent state and federal jurisdiction. 6 1 Justice Rehnquist also concluded that the continuing pendency of
the rule 10b-5 claim for damages 6 2 in the district court was a mere delay in
its adjudication, which was inadequate grounds for the issuance of a writ of
mandamus. 63
Justice Blackmun, in a brief concurring opinion, believed the issuance
of the writ to be improper on the ground that Judge Will had ordered the
stay prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Colorado River, and therefore
without its guidance. 6 4 In dictum, Justice Blackmun indicated his disapproval of Justice Rehnquist's reliance on Brilihart, stating that Colorado
65
River had "cut back on ... [the] sweeping language" of Brillhart.
In a strongly worded dissent,6 6 Justice Brennan criticized the plurality's
"misreliance on Brillhart,"6 7 its "misapplication of Colorado River," 68 its
58. See text accompanying notes 10 & 11 supra.
59. 437 U.S. at 665-66.
60. Id. at 666 n.9. See note 4 and accompanying text supra. The equitable claim could be
ruled on by the state court because Calvert brought it up by way of defense in the state action.
437 U.S. at 666 n.9. See also Aetna v. Altheimer, 430 F.2d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1970).
61. 437 U.S. at 666 n.9.
62. As the claim for damages was not heard in the state court, see text accompanying note 9
supra, Justice Rehnquist maintained that only Calvert's rule 10b-5 claim for damages was subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction. 437 U.S. at 659.
63. Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that a writ could properly issue "[w]here a district court
obstinately refuses to adjudicate a matter properly before it," for such conduct would be tantamount to an obstruction of the appellate procedure. 437 U.S. at 666-67. Nothwithstanding
Calvert's contentions that Judge Will "in effect" stayed the claim for damages under rule lob-5,
Justice Rehnquist implied that it is necessary to allege "a heedless refusal to proceed" in order
for a writ to issue. Id. at 667. Furthermore, Justice Rehnquist characterized the delay as "simply a product of the normal excessive load of business in the District Court" compounded by
Judge Will's participation in the mandamus proceedings, thereby foreclosing any possibility of
inferring the necessary "heedless refusal." Id. See notes 14 & 15 and accompanying text supra.
64. 437 U.S. at 668 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Apparently acknowledging the extraordinary
nature of the writ of mandamus, Justice Blackmun stated that the issuance of the writ was
premature because the court of appeals should have required reconsideration of the case by
Judge Will in light of Colorado River. Id.
65. Id. at 667 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun stated that he was not sure that
Brillhart, a diversity case, was fully compatible with Colorado River, a "federal-issue" case. Id.
See text accompanying notes 92 & 93 infra.
66. Justice Brennan was joined in his dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Marshall and Powell. Chief Justice Burger also wrote a separate dissenting opinion to
emphasize his nonparticipation in that portion of Justice Brennan's opinion dealing with res
judicata. See note 70 infra. The Chief Justice found it unnecessary in the context of Calvert to
discuss whether a federal court should give res judicata effect to state court judgments which
implicate federal claims over which the federal courts have been granted exclusive jurisdiction.
437 U.S. at 668 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
67. 437 U.S. at 674 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated that neither the logic
nor the holding of Brillhart was controlling in Calvert. First, he noted that Brillhart was

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol24/iss4/8

8

Goldstein: Federal Courts - Use of Mandamus to Compel Adjudication of a Clai

1978-1979]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

failure to accord sufficient respect to "exclusive" federal jurisdiction, 69 and
its avoidance of the res judicata problems that would follow from its decision. 70 Justice Brennan concluded that the writ of mandamus was proper

grounded on diversity jurisdiction and therefore state, rather than federal, law applied. Id. at
671 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Second, and more significant, Justice Brennan noted that Brillhart involved a suit for a declaratory judgment. Id. Justice Brennan observed that under the
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976), the assumption of jurisdiction over such
actions is expressly discretionary. 437 U.S. at 671 (Brennan, J., dissenting). That act provides:
"In a case ... within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States, upon the filing of an
appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party
seeking such declaration ....
28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976) (emphasis added). In contrast, in Calvert, the dissent noted that "federal jurisdiction is not only non-discretionary, but [it is] exclusive." 437 U.S. at 672 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied by the dissent). See note 9
supra.
68. 437 U.S. at 674 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan maintained that the clear
holding of Colorado River was that a "federal court's power to dismiss the suit before it in
deference to the parallel [state] proceeding is limited by the 'virtually unflagging obligation of
the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them.' " Id. at 673 (Brennan, J., dissenting),
quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976).
See note 43 and accompanying text supra. Noting that the facts of Calvert did not fall into any
of the three categories where abstention would be appropriate, Justice Brennan stated that the
"exceptional" circumstances necessary for dismissal on the ground of "wise judicial administration" did not exist. 437 U.S. at 673 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See notes 40-44 and accompanying
text supra.
Justice Brennan also observed that the decisive factor permitting dismissal in Colorado
River was the "clear federal policy ... recogniz[ing] the availability of comprehensive state
systems for adjudication of water rights as the means for achieving ... [the federal] goals." 437
U.S. at 673 (Brennan, J., dissenting), quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v.
United States, 424 U.S. 800, 819 (1976). Justice Brennan distinguished Calvert as follows: "[A]s
evinced by the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts to determine 1934 Act claims, the
relevant federal policy here is the precise opposite of that found to require deference to the
concurrent state proceeding in Colorado River." 437 U.S. at 673 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
69. 437 U.S. at 670-72 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated: "When Congress
thus mandates that only federal courts shall exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate specified claims,
the 'well established' principle . . . that 'the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to
proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction,' governs a
multo fortiori." Id. at 670 (Brennan, J., dissenting), quoting McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S.
268, 282 (1910). Justice Brennan criticized Justice Rehnquist for his "flouting" of McClellan,
"a decision that has stood unquestioned for nearly 70 years." 437 U.S. at 669 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
70. 437 U.S. at 676 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In disputing Justice Rehnquist's conclusion
that the delay in the adjudication of Calvert's damages claim was not equivalent to a stay,
Justice Brennan noted:
First, at the time the Court of Appeals granted the writ, Calvert's 10b-5 damages action
had been before Judge Will for more than two and a half years without a ruling on the
basic legal issue underlying the claim. Second, and for me dispositive, the District Court
indicated that it would give the state court's determination that the disputed transaction
did not involve a "security" within the meaning of the 1934 Act res judicata effect,
thereby depriving Calvert of a federal court determination of a legal issue within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Id. at 677 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). For a discussion of the treatment of this
issue by the Court, see note 63 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of whether a
federal court may give res judicata effect to a state court determination of a question within
exclusive federal jurisdiction, see generally Note, Res Judicata: Exclusive FederalJurisdiction
and the Effect of Prior State-Court Determinations, 53 VA. L. REv. 1360 (1967).
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of his
either because of Judge Will's "clear abuse of discretion" 71 or because
72
failure to exercise his authority when it was his duty to do so.
An independent analysis of the facts of Calvert under the Colorado
River criteria for abstention clearly indicates that abstention in the instant
case was unwarranted. 73 Furthermore, it is doubtful that support for dismissal under a' "wise judicial administration" argument could be found in
light of the federal policy evidenced by the grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction over rule 10b-5 claims. 74 Contrary to Justice Brennan's dissent,
however, the plurality never attempted to bring Calvert within the ambit of
the Colorado River decision. 75 Justice Rehnquist never reached the issue of

whether Judge Will's stay was appropriate, but rather addressed the issue of
whether mandamus was the proper remedy to be used to compel adjudication of the rule 10b-5 claims. 76 Justice Rehnquist's conclusion, however,
that mandamus cannot be an appropriate remedy because one cannot have a
"clear and indisputable" right to a matter that has been committed to a
court's discretion, 77 although seemingly logical, can only be meaningful if his
premises were correct as applied to the proceedings in Calvert. In particular, the premise that a district court has discretionary power to withhold the
exercise of exclusive federal jurisdiction in a case properly brought before
it 7 8 must withstand scrutiny.
71. 437 U.S. at 676 (Brennan, J., dissenting), quoting La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352
U.S. 249, 257 (1957). For a discussion of Justice Rehnquist's treatment of La Buy, see note 57
supra.
72, 437 U.S. at 676 (Brennan, J., dissenting), citing Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95
(1967); Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943). See note 48 and accompanying
text supra. Justice Brennan further stated that "there is simply a complete dearth of 'exceptional' circumstances countervailing the District Court's 'unflagging obligation' to exercise its
exclusive jurisdiction." 437 U.S. at 676 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
73. The stayed claim in Calvert did not fall within any of the traditional abstention categories.
See note 40 supra.
74. See Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Will, 560 F.2d 792, 796 (7th Cir. 1977). See also text
accompanying notes 9 & 69 supra; note 68 supra. Perhaps the argument could be made that
because Colorado River authorizes a dismissal for reasons of "wise judicial administration"
under "exceptional circumstances," this implies the validation of a stay for reasons of "wise
judicial administration" under less than "exceptional" circumstances, a stay being a less severe
order than a dismissal. See generally note 44 supra. It is arguable, however, that there is no
real difference between a stay and a dismissal where the court intends to give res judicata effect
to the state court determination.
75. Justice Brennan stated that since Calvert "falls within none of the three general abstentation categories, . . . the opinion of. . . [Justice] Rehnquist . ..strains to bring . ..[Calvert]
within the principles that govern in a very narrow class of 'exceptional' situations." 437 U.S. at
668-69 (Brennan, J., dissenting). An examination of Justice Rehnquist's opinion, however, reveals no claim of "exceptional circumstances" or application of the "wise judicial administration"
test.
76. See notes 56-63 and accompanying text supra. Although Justice Rehnquist indicated that
even an abuse of discretion by the district court should not be overridden by a writ of mandamus, see note 57 and accompanying text supra, the Supreme Court has held to the contrary
on prior occasions. See, e.g., Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 511 (1959)
(abuse of discretion in disallowing jury trial corrected by mandamus); La Buy v. Howes Leather
Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957) (abuse of discretion in allowing case to be heard by master corrected
by mandamus); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953) (mandamus may
be used where there is clear abuse of discretion). See note 71 and accompanying text supra.
77. See text accompanying notes 55 & 56 supra.
78. See generally notes 52-63 and accompanying text supra.
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Justice Rehnquist's reliance on Brillhart for support of this position is
difficult to justify. 79 Brillhart involved a declaratory judgment action, in
which the assumption of jurisdiction is expressly discretionary. 0 In contrast, Calvert's rule 10b-5 claim not only was not for a declaratory judgment, 8 ' but was also within exclusive federal jurisdiction, and federal courts
remain obligated to expeditiously consider and resolve those claims which
Congress explicitly reserved to the federal courts. 82 It is submitted that
Justice Rehnquist's position that the hearing of an "exclusive" federal claim
as a defense in state court causes it to lose its power to command a federal
adjudication s 3 is inconsistent with legislative mandate. 84 Furthermore, although it is not contested that the state court may rule on Calvert's exclusive
federal claim when it is asserted as a defense,8 5 it is also clear that there is
nothing to prevent the federal district court from hearing the claim concurrently. 86
Justice Rehnquist's reliance on Colorado River for the proposition that
the decision to stay "is largely committed to the 'carefully considered judgment' . . . of the District Court" 8 7 is similarly misplaced. The Colorado

79. Since Justice Blackmun and the dissenters criticized Justice Rehnquist's reliance on
Brillhart, it is submitted that Brillhart is believed to be inapposite by a majority of the Court.
See notes 65 & 67 and accompanying text supra. Moreover, the Court's holding in Brillhart was
expressly limited to those issues "not governed by federal law." Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of
America, 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942). See text accompanying note 34 supra.
80. See note 67 supra.
81. Calvert's two claims under rule 10b-5 were for rescission and damages. See text accompanying notes 11 & 12 supra.
Although it could be argued that the delay in the adjudication of the rule 10b-5 claim for
damages was in effect a stay and should be treated as such, for purposes of the remainder of this
note Justice Rehnquist's reasoning on this issue will be followed, and it will be assumed that
Calvert's rule 10b-5 claim for damages-which was not brought before the state court-was not
effectively stayed by the continuing delay in its adjudication. See note 63 and accompanying text
supra.
82. 437 U.S. at 668 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The courts of appeals have generally held
that district courts should not stay claims over which the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. See, e.g., Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Will, 560 F.2d 792, 796 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other
grounds, 437 U.S. 655 (1978); Cotler v. Inter-County Orthopedic Ass'n, 526 F.2d 537, 542 (3d
Cir. 1975); Lecor, Inc. v. United States District Court, 502 F.2d 104, 106 (9th Cir. 1974).
Although Justice Rehnquist reasoned that Judge Will ordered a stay of the claim for equitable relief and not a dismissal, and that federal jurisdiction was therefore not extinguished, a
more realistic view is that Judge Will's stay was tantamount to a dismissal in light of his intention to give res judicata effect to the state court determination. See note 70 supra.
83. See notes 59-61 and accompanying text supra.
84. See notes 9 & 69 and accompanying text supra. Justice Rehnquist's suggestion that because the equitable claim may be ruled on by the state court, albeit by way of defense, the
statutory grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction becomes meaningless, was without explanation
and seemingly without basis. As Justice Brennan noted, there are valid reasons for recognizing
federal jurisdiction notwithstanding the ability of the state court to decide the issue-for instance, the use of liberal federal discovery procedures, and federal court "expertise." 437 U.S.
at 675 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
85. See note 60 supra.
86. See note 51 and accompanying text supra. It is submitted that the fact that a state court
may decide an issue by way of defense does not relieve the federal courts from exercising their
"exclusive" jurisdiction. See notes 83 & 84 and accompanying text supra.
87. See note 52 and accompanying text supra.
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River Court did not purport to deal with cases of exclusive federal jurisdiction,"" but rather had before it a situation where congressional policy dictated a state court resolution of such conflicts. 89
Since Justice Rehnquist's conclusion in Calvert that mandamus should
not have issued was dependent upon a showing that the district courts have
discretion to hear cases within exclusive federal jurisdiction, 90 his failure to
adequately support the premise undermines that line of reasoning. 91 On
the other hand, in the absence of a valid argument to the contrary, the
dissent's position that Judge Will's stay was not proper under Colorado
River and that Calvert had a "clear and indisputable" right to a federal adjudication of its federal claim leads to the conclusion that the issuance of the
writ was proper.
The potential impact of Calvert as to the impropriety of mandamus to
direct the adjudication of a claim within "exclusive" federal jurisdiction
where a state proceeding may concurrently resolve the issue is severely limited by Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion. Since Justice Blackmun
agreed with the dissenters that Brillhart was inapposite, 92 a majority of the
Court would not have applied the reasoning of Brillhart to the facts of Calvert. 93 It is therefore submitted that the district courts would be remiss in
deciding any subsequent cases presenting similar issues without conducting
an analysis similar to that employed in Colorado River. 94 Although Justice
Blackmun hinted of possible future alignment with the Colorado River
analysis suggested by the dissenters in Calvert, it must be remembered that
his cursory objection to the plurality's reasoning was dictum. 9 5 Furthermore, should Justice Blackmun become aligned with the dissenters in similar
cases in the future, his brief opinion does not indicate whether he would do

88. The Court in Colorado River stated: "[A] carefully considered judgment taking into
account both the obligation to exercise jurisdiction and the combination of factors counselling
against that exercise is required." 424 U.S. at 818-19. This language certainly permits some
degree of discretion in the district court, but must be read in the context of the facts of Colorado River, in which the Court was not faced with the issue of abstention in cases involving a
claim subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction.
89. See note 68 supra.
90. See notes 52-54 and accompanying text supra.
91. It should be noted, however, that in areas other than exclusive federal jurisdiction,
Justice Rehnquist's reasoning may well apply. See note 98 and accompanying text infra.
92. See notes 65, 67 & 79 and accompanying text supra.
93. See note 79 supra. See also notes 65 & 67 and accompanying text supra.
94. See notes 64-65 & 68 and accompanying text supra. Since the Calvert decision, Judge
Will has reconfirmed his stay by using a Colorado River analysis. See note 97 and accompanying
text infra.
95. See note 65 and accompanying text supra. Justice Blackmun's statement that Judge Will
did not have the guidance of Colorado River was perhaps an indication of Justice Blackmun's
belief that Colorado River may mandate a different result. See note 64 and accompanying text
supra. His conclusion that the issuance of the writ was premature instead of wrong may indicate
that mandamus would have been proper had Judge Will stayed the action in light of Colorado
River. See note 64 supra. It is therefore submitted that Justice Blackmun could possibly side
with the Calvert dissenters in subsequent cases presenting similar issues, thereby creating a
new majority position.
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so by joining in their Calvert reasoning or on separate grounds. This area of
the law is apparently still open to controversy.
There are important questions left unanswered by the Calvert decision,
the most far reaching of which stems from the Court's failure to address the
question of whether Judge Will's stay was appropriate under Colorado
River. 96 In an apparent attempt to clarify the scope of the district courts'
discretionary powers, Judge Will, subsequent to the Calvert decision, reconfirmed his stay on Calvert's equitable claim and entered a stay on the dam97
ages claim.
An important application of Calvert may arise in the situation where a
district court judge wrongfully stays a "nonexclusive" federal action. It is in
these situations that Justice Rehnquist's analysis becomes significant, for it
might be argued that although the grant of the stay was wrong, the fact that
Colorado River appears to give minimal discretion to the district courts
should bar the issuance of a writ. 98
Although the abstention doctrine touches a relatively small percentage
of the caseload of a district court judge, 99 it has been said that the uncertainty in this area "could prove to be disastrous for the federal judicial system."100 Calvert, with its limited holding, 101 does little to clear up the
lingering uncertainties, perhaps even obfuscating them further.' 0 2 Calvert
10 3
however, has brought into focus the issues which need to be resolved,
10 4
and has set the stage for the next confrontation.
Glenn S. Goldstein

96. It is submitted that the majority would have provided additional support for its holding
had they concluded that the stay was appropriate under Colorado River.
97. See Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reinsurance Co., 459 F. Supp. 859 (N.D.
I11.
1978). Judge Will relied on Colorado River for the discretionary power to stay the action.
Id. at 863-64. The district judge apparently then authorized an interlocutory appeal. Id. at 866.
This action will require the resolution of the very important questions left unanswered by the
Calvert Court. See note 103 and accompanying text infra.
98. On the other hand, it could be argued that Colorado River only recognizes discretion in
cases where there is an express federal policy favoring state adjudication. See note 68 supra.
Additionally, it may be argued that under La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957),
an abuse of discretion may be grounds for the issuance of the writ. See note 76 and accompanying text supra. But see note 57 and accompanying text supra.
99. One survey has indicated that 68.1% of the responding judges were faced with only one
to five possible abstention cases in a two-year period. Over 10% had no such cases. Federal
Abstention, supra note 25, at 648-49.
100. Id. at 652.
101. The Calvert Court's holding went only to the issue of mandamus. See notes 59, 64 & 76
and accompanying text supra.
102. See Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reinsurance Co., 459 F. Supp. 859, 864 &
n.4 (N.D. I11.
1978).
103. The broad issues which should be resolved are: 1) whether a district court has discretion
to abstain where there is exclusive federal jurisdiction but a state court is concurrently hearing
the issue by way of defense; and 2) whether a district court has discretion to abstain where
there is exclusive federal jurisdiction and no concurrent state proceedings. See note 97 and
accompanying text supra.
104. See note 97 and accompanying text supra.
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